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Abstract. We study relations between evidence theory and S-approximation
spaces. Both theories have their roots in the analysis of Dempster’s mul-
tivalued mappings and lower and upper probabilities, and have close re-
lations to rough sets. We show that an S-approximation space, satisfying
a monotonicity condition, can induce a natural belief structure which is
a fundamental block in evidence theory. We also demonstrate that one
can induce a natural belief structure on one set, given a belief struc-
ture on another set, if the two sets are related by a partial monotone
S-approximation space.
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1. Introduction
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence. The Dempster-Shafer theory of
evidence is a well-known method in dealing with uncertainty in problems. It
originated in 1967 with the introduction of lower and upper probabilities by
Dempster [2]. A belief structure is a fundamental concept in this theory which
assigns two numeric values to each subset of a given set. These values are
known as the belief and plausibility measures. See [8] for a detailed treatment.
S-Approximation. S-approximation spaces are a new way of handling un-
certainty, which also originated from Dempster’s concepts of lower and upper
probabilities [4]. The motivation for this new approach is that it can be seen as
a unifying view to rough sets and their extensions, such as [1, 6, 7, 13, 15, 16, 20],
since they are all expressible in terms of S-approximation spaces [12, 4]. Hence,
any results obtained over S-approximations can be naturally applied to rough
sets and many of their extensions, too‡. However, S-approximations are ca-
pable of representing more than (extensions of) rough sets and model a very
broad range of possible approximations (See [4, 12] for more examples).
Previous Works on S-Approximations. The concept of S-approximation
has been studied by several approaches and its relation to various theories have
been examined. For example, S-approximations are studied in the context of
Yao’s three-way decisions theory [18, 10] and extended its results. Moreover,
they have also been studied in the contexts of neighborhood systems [17, 9],
intuitionistic fuzzy set theory [11] and with relations to topology [3].
Motivation. Given the common background and overlap of goals, connec-
tions between evidence theory and other theories of approximation have been
studied for a long time, e.g. its connections to the theory of rough sets are
considered in [5, 14, 19]. The close links between S-approximation spaces and
rough sets suggest that a study of relations between evidence theory and S-
approximation spaces can yield to more general variants of these results. In
this work, we obtain such results about the connections between evidence the-
ory and S-approximation spaces and propose paths for future research.
Organization. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we first
review some basic facts from evidence theory, S-approximation spaces, and their
corresponding three-way decisions. Then, we study the connection between S-
approximation spaces and evidence theory in Section 3. Finally, the paper
concludes in Section 4 by suggesting interesting directions for future research.
‡This includes all the results reported in the current paper.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence. In this section, we briefly dis-
cuss some background on the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. We follow
the standard presentation in [8].
Basic Probability Assignments. A basic probability assignment, or bpa
for short, is a fundamental concept in evidence theory. Let W be a finite non-
empty set. Then, a bpa over W is a mapping m : P(W )→ [0, 1] satisfying the
following conditions: (a) m(∅) = 0, and (b)
∑
X⊆W m(X) = 1.
Belief Structures. A setX ⊆W is called a focal element ofm ifm(X) 6= 0.
LetM be the collection of all focal elements ofm, then the pair (M,m) is called
a belief structure on W .
Belief and Plausibility. Given a belief structure (M,m), a belief function
Bel : P(W ) → [0, 1] and a plausibility function Pl : P(W ) → [0, 1] can be
derived, which are defined as follows for every X ⊆W :
Bel(X) :=
∑
Y⊆X
m(Y ), (2.1)
and
Pl(X) :=
∑
Y ∩X 6=∅
m(Y ), (2.2)
respectively. Note that the Bel and Pl functions are duals, i.e. Bel(X) =
1 − Pl(Xc). Moreover, [Bel(X),Pl(X)] and Pl(X) − Bel(X) are called the
confidence interval and the ignorance level of X , respectively.
Axiomatic Approach. A belief function can equivalently be defined in an
axiomatic manner, i.e. it must satisfy the following axioms:
• Bel(∅) = 0,
• Bel(W ) = 1,
• Bel
(
∪ℓi=1Xi
)
≥
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,ℓ}(−1)
|I|+1Bel(∩i∈IXi) for {X1, . . . , Xℓ} ⊆
P(W ) and ℓ > 0.
2.2. S-approximation spaces. In this section, some basic facts and defi-
nitions for S-approximation spaces are presented. We follow the notation
of [10, 4].
S-Approximation Spaces. An S-approximation space is formally defined as
a quadruple G = (U,W, T, S), where U and W are finite non-empty sets, T is
a multi-valued mapping T : U → P(W ), called a knowledge component, and S
is a mapping S : P(W )× P(W )→ {0, 1}, called a decider.
Lower and Upper Approximations. Given an S-approximation space G =
(U,W, T, S), the lower and upper approximations of X ⊆W are defined as
G(X) = {x ∈ U | S(T (x), X) = 1} , (2.3)
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and
G(X) = {x ∈ U | S(T (x), Xc) = 0} , (2.4)
respectively, where Xc denotes the complement of X with respect to W .
Generality and Special Cases. Note that the mapping S can model a
large class of measures, of which set inclusion, i.e. S⊆(A,B) =
{
1 A ⊆ B
0 otherwsie
,
is a special case. If we set S to S⊆ and consider the sets of form T (x) as blocks,
we can model rough sets and some of their generalizations as special cases. For
more information and other examples of decider functions consult [4, 10, 9, 12].
Moreover, other definitions and extensions have also been proposed for decider
mappings, e.g. refer to [11] to see an instance suitable for intuitionistic fuzzy
sets. However, in this paper we stick to the standard and general definition of
S-approximation spaces as defined above.
Trichotomy Regions. For any set X ⊆W , the three pair-wise disjoint sets
of positive, negative and boundary regions are defined as follows:
POSG(X) := {x ∈ U | S(T (x), X) = 1 ∧ S(T (x), Xc) = 0} (Positive Region)
= G(X) ∩G(X),
NEGG(X) := {x ∈ U | S(T (x), X) = 0 ∧ S(T (x), Xc) = 1} (Negative Region)
= U \
(
G(X) ∪G(X)
)
,
BRG(X) := {x ∈ U | S(T (x), X) = S(T (x), Xc)} (Boundary Region)
= G(X)∆G(X),
(2.5)
where A∆B = (A \B) ∪ (B \A) for A,B ⊆ U .
It is noteworthy that the intuition behind Equation 2.5 is very similar to
that of [18] (Equation 1). Refer to [9] for more discussion on this point. It is
also the case that POSG(X) = NEGG(X
c) and BRG(X) = BRG(X
c) for any
X ⊆W [9]. We will routinely use these facts throughout the paper.
Partial Monotonicity. A decider mapping S : P(W ) × P(W ) → {0, 1} is
called partial monotone if X ⊆ Y ⊆W and S(A,X) = 1 imply that S(A, Y ) =
1 for any A ⊆ W . An S-approximation space G = (U,W, T, S) with a partial
monotone decider mapping S is called a partial monotone S-approximation
space. The lower and upper approximation operators and the three decision
regions of such S-approximation spaces satisfy several important properties
which are listed in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 ([10, 12]). Let G = (U,W, T, S) be a partial monotone S-
approximation space. For all X,Y ⊆W , we have:
(1) X ⊆ Y implies G(X) ⊆ G(Y ),
(2) X ⊆ Y implies G(X) ⊆ G(Y ),
(3) G(X ∪ Y ) ⊇ G(X) ∪G(Y ),
(4) G(X ∩ Y ) ⊆ G(X) ∩G(Y ),
A Note on Belief Structures and S-approximation Spaces 5
(5) G(X ∪ Y ) ⊇ G(X) ∪G(Y ),
(6) G(X ∩ Y ) ⊆ G(X) ∩G(Y ),
(7) G(X) = (G(Xc))c,
(8) G(X) = (G(Xc))c,
(9) X ⊆ Y implies POSG(X) ⊆ POSG(Y ),
(10) X ⊆ Y implies NEGG(Y ) ⊆ NEGG(X),
(11) POSG(X ∪ Y ) ⊇ POSG(X) ∪ POSG(Y ),
(12) NEGG(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ NEGG(X) ∪ NEGG(Y ),
(13) POSG(X ∩ Y ) ⊆ POSG(X) ∩ POSG(Y ),
(14) NEGG(X ∩ Y ) ⊇ NEGG(X) ∩ NEGG(Y ),
(15) POSG(X) ∩ NEGG(Y ) ⊆ POSG(X) ∩ NEGG(X ∩ Y ).
Inflection Sets. Partial monotone S-approximation spaces can be rep-
resented by an equivalent form, which is called an inflection set. A pair
(x,X) ∈ U × P(W ) is called an inflection point with respect to G when-
ever S(T (x), X) = 1 and for all Y ( X , we have S(T (x), Y ) = 0 [10]. The
inflection set of a partial monotone G, which is denoted by IS(G), is de-
fined as the set of all of its inflection points. Moreover, for x ∈ U we use
IPG(x) to represent the collection of X ⊆ W where (x,X) ∈ IS(G), so that
IS(G) = ∪x∈U {(x,X)|X ∈ IPG(x)}.
Trivial Elements. An element x ∈ U is called trivial if we have either
IPG(x) = ∅ or IPG(x) = {∅}. In the former case, we have S(T (x), X) = 0
for all X ⊆ W , so x appears in none of the lower approximations G(X) and
in every upper approximation G(Xc). So, the element x is not providing any
useful information, i.e. it cannot be used to distinguish any pair of subsets ofW .
Similarly, in the latter case, S(T (x), ∅) = 1, which, due to partial monotonicity,
implies S(T (x), X) = 1 for all X ⊆ W . Hence, for all X ⊆ W , we have
x ∈ G(X) and x 6∈ G(Xc). So x does not provide any useful information in
this case, either.
Reducibility. As argued above, if x is a trivial element, one can remove x and
get a smaller system from which one can get just as much information as the
initial system. A partial monotone S-approximation space is called reducible if
it contains a trivial element, otherwise we call it irreducible.
3. S-approximation spaces and belief structures
In this section, we study the relationship between S-approximation spaces
and belief structures.
The qualities of lower and upper approximations with respect to an S-
approximation space are defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be an S-approximation space. The
qualities of lower and upper approximations of a set X ⊆W with respect to G
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are defined as:
Q
G
(X) =
|POSG(X)|
|U |
, (3.1)
and
QG(X) =
|POSG(X)|+ |BRG(X)|
|U |
. (3.2)
The qualities defined in Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are dual. This is stated more
formally in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be an S-approximation space. Then,
for all X ⊆W we have Q
G
(X) = 1−QG(X
c).
Proof. The proof is as follows and uses the fact that POSG(X) = NEGG(X
c):
Q
G
(X) =
|POSG(X)|
|U |
=
|NEGG(Xc)|
|U |
=
|U \ (POSG(Xc) ∪ BRG(Xc))|
|U |
=1−
|POSG(Xc)|+ |BRG(Xc)|
|U |
=1−QG(X
c).
(3.3)

Next, we consider the properties of these quality values for a partial mono-
tone S-approximation space.
Proposition 3.3. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be a partial monotone S-approximation
space. Then, Q
G
(∅) = 0.
Proof. It suffices to show that POSG(∅) = ∅. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose there exists some x ∈ U such that x ∈ POSG(∅). So, it is the case
that S(T (x), ∅) = 1 and S(T (x),W ) = 0. This is a contradiction with par-
tial monotonicity of G, since ∅ ⊆ W and we need to have S(T (x),W ) = 1.
Therefore the desired result is obtained. 
Proposition 3.4. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be an irreducible partial monotone
S-approximation space. Then, Q
G
(W ) = 1.
Proof. Note that G is irreducible, hence for every x ∈ U, there exists X ⊆
W, such that S(T (x), X) = 1§. Therefore, by partial monotonicity, we have
S(T (x),W ) = 1 for all x ∈ U . Moreover, S(T (x), ∅) = 0 for all x ∈ U . Hence,
x ∈ POSG(W ) for all x ∈ U and POSG(W ) = U . So, QG(W ) =
|U|
|U| = 1. 
§Otherwise x is trivial and G is reducible, which is a contradiction.
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Proposition 3.5. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be a partial monotone S-approximation
space. Then, for all ℓ ∈ N we have
Q
G
(∪ℓi=1Xi) ≥
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,ℓ}
(−1)|I|+1Q
G
(∩i∈IXi), (3.4)
where Xi ⊆W .
Proof. By the definition, we have
Q
G
(∪ℓi=1Xi) =
∣∣POSG(∪ℓi=1Xi)∣∣
|U |
. (3.5)
By partial monotonicity of G, we have∣∣POSG(∪ℓi=1Xi)∣∣
|U |
≥
∣∣∪ℓi=1POSG(Xi)∣∣
|U |
, (3.6)
since POSG(∪
ℓ
i=1Xi) ⊇ ∪
ℓ
i=1POSG(Xi). Now the desired result can be obtained
by appling the inclusion-exclusion principle. 
Propositions 3.3 to 3.5 result in the following:
Proposition 3.6. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be an irreducible partial monotone
S-approximation space. The quality of lower approximation, as defined in Def-
inition 3.1, is a belief function.
Similarly, for an irreducible partial monotone S-approximation space, the
quality of upper approximation is a plausibility function. This is treated more
formally in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.7. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be an irreducible partial monotone S-
approximation space. Then the quality of upper approximation, as defined in
Definition 3.1, is a plausibility function.
Proof. By the duality of belief and plausibility functions, we have PlG(X) =
1− BelG(Xc) and this is all we have to show. By the definition, we have
Q
G
(Xc) =
|POSG(Xc)|
|U |
=
|NEGG(X)|
|U |
=
|U \ (POSG(X) ∪ BRG(X))|
|U |
=1−
|POSG(X)|+ |BRG(X)|
|U |
=1−QG(X).
(3.7)
By applying Proposition 3.6, the desired result is obtained. 
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By Propositions 3.6 and 3.7, it can be said that every irreducible partial
monotone S-approximation space induces a belief structure on W .
Theorem 3.8. Let G = (U,W, T, S) be an irreducible partial monotone S-
approximation space. Then, G induces a belief structure (M,m) on W where
m(X) =
∑
Y⊆X
(−1)|X\Y |Q
G
(Y ), (3.8)
and
M = {X ⊆W | m(X) 6= 0} , (3.9)
for X ⊆W .
Proof. The bpa can be defined from a belief function, which is the quality of
lower approximation (by Proposition 3.6), by the following relation
n(A) =
∑
B⊆A
(−1)|A\B| Bel(B), (3.10)
where n is a bpa [19]. This concludes the proof. 
Next, we show that belief structures can induce S-approximation spaces.
Theorem 3.9. Suppose that (M,m) is a given belief structure over a finite
non-empty set W such that for all focal elements X ∈ M, there exist a, b ∈
Z+ such that m(X) = a
b
. Then, there exists an S-approximation space G =
(U,W, T, S) such that the quality of lower and upper approximations with respect
to G are the corresponding belief and plausibility functions.
Proof. The proof is by construction. Without loss of generality, we assume
that there exists a constant d ∈ Z+ such that for all focal elements X ∈ M,
we have m(X) = c
d
for some c ∈ Z+. This is easy to obtain by computing the
least common multiple.
Now define the set U as U = {1, . . . , d}. For each X ∈ M with m(X) = lX
d
,
we choose a subset AX of size lX of U . We assume that the AX ’s are pairwise
disjoint. We can always find such disjoint AX ’s, since
∑
X∈Mm(X) = 1 and
hence
∑
X∈M lX = d. Now for each i ∈ AX , we let T (i) = X . Finally, we let
the decider mapping S be the ordinary set inclusion operator S⊆.
Next, it is easy to see that G satisfies the conditions of Propositions 3.6
and 3.7. Therefore, the qualities of lower and upper approximations with re-
spect to G are belief and plausibility functions, respectively.
Finally, we show that for all X ⊆W , the belief and plausibility values of X
with respect to (M,m) are equal to the corresponding values with respect to
G. Since the belief and plausibility functions are dual, it suffices to show the
result for belief. This can be done as follows:
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Q
G
(X) =
|POSG(X)|
|U |
=
|{x ∈ U | T (x) ⊆ X}|
|U |
=
∑
Y⊆X
m(Y ) = Bel(X).
(3.11)
This concludes the proof. 
Now suppose that we are given a belief structure (M,m) over U and an
irreducible partial monotone S-approximation space G = (U,W, T, S). Then
we can induce a belief structure (M′,m′) on W by declaring M′ as
M′ = {Z ⊆W | ∃x ∈ U, (x, Z) ∈ IS(G)}, (3.12)
and the bpa m′ as
m′(Y ) =
{ ∑
X∈M
m(X)
|X| ×
(∑
x∈X, Y ∈IPG(x)
1
|IPG(x)|
)
if Y ∈ M′,
0 otherwise.
(3.13)
The intuition behind Equation 3.13 is that the bpa value of every X ∈ M
is divided between each x ∈ X equally likely, which are called their shares.
Then, the bpa m′ of Y ∈ M′ receives the shares of those x ∈ X for which
Y ∈ IPG(X).
Theorem 3.10. Given a belief structure (M,m) on a finite non-empty set U
and an irreducible partial monotone S-approximation space G = (U,W, T, S),
(M′,m′) as defined in Equations 3.12 and 3.13 is a valid belief structure on U .
Proof. The bpa m′ needs to satisfy two conditions, i.e. (1) m′(∅) = 0 and (2)∑
Y⊆W m
′(Y ) = 1. By the hypothesis that ∅ /∈ IPG(x) for all x ∈ U , we have
∅ /∈ M′ and therefore, its bpa value m′(∅) is zero. The second property can be
proven as follows (note that for all x ∈ X ∈ M, we have IPG(x) ⊆M′):
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∑
Y⊆W
m′(Y ) =
∑
Y ∈M′
m′(Y )
=
∑
Y ∈M′
∑
X∈M
m(X)
|X |
×

 ∑
x∈X | Y ∈IPG(x)
1
|IPG(x)|


=
∑
x∈X∈M,Y∈IPG(x)⊆M′
m(X)
|X |
×
1
|IPG(x)|
=
∑
X∈M
m(X)
|X |
×

 ∑
x∈X, Y ∈IPG(x)
1
|IPG(x)|


=
∑
X∈M
m(X)
|X |
×
(∑
x∈X
1
)
=
∑
X∈M
m(X) = 1.
(3.14)

4. Conclusion and future research directions
In this paper, we studied some connections between the Dempster-Shafer’s
theory of evidence and the concept of S-approximation spaces. First, we defined
two numeric measures called the qualities of lower and upper approximations
for S-approximation spaces. Then, we showed that they can be used to derive
a belief structure from an irreducible partial monotone S-approximation space
in a natural way. Finally, we showed that given a belief structure on a set U
and an irreducible partial monotone S-approximation space G = (U,W, T, S),
a valid natural belief structure can be induced on W .
The results obtained in this paper are the first ones settling a relation be-
tween the two theories and are extensible by trying to answer the following
proposed problems:
(1) Can belief structures be generalized to two universal sets with respect
to an arbitrary S-approximation space in a natural or meaningful way?
(2) Can the results of this paper be extended to neighborhood systems,
especially the ones in [9]? For example, by fusing knowledge mappings
of multiple S-approximation spaces with a similar approach to [5].
(3) Can the qualities of lower and upper approximations be used to reduce
the knowledge mappings in the context of [9]? For example, can one
find a minimal set of knowledge mappings of multiple S-approximation
spaces for which the amount of information one can obtain from that
set does not change compared to the case when she uses all of them?
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